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CASE NOTES
to continue. A distributor could continue to refuse to deal except in blocks
of films as long as it had other customers with whom it might negotiate.
Moreover, the price differential between one film and a block of films was
not specifically limited to cost justification. This, the Government contended,
would create serious enforcement problems. Also under the district court's
decree the distributors would be allowed to continue their common practice
of quoting only block prices and would be required to quote an individual
price only upon request. The Court, although noting that some of the
practices discussed above when viewed alone may not require injunctive
relief, provided for additional redress in an effort to prevent any recurrence
of the illegal acts. Television stations may now expect individually quoted
prices which may not exceed prices of films offered in packages other than
for legitimate cost justifications. Thus, the quality of films appearing on
television should improve through the rightful operation of free competition.
C. RONALD ROBLEY
Bankruptcy—Section 70c—Lewis Case Extended.—Pacific Fin. Corp. v.
Edwards. 1—At the date of bankruptcy, April 1, 1960, bankrupt had in his
possession an automobile which had been sold to him under a conditional
sales contract that was dated October 10, 1959. 3 The purchaser acknowl-
edged delivery of the automobile in the contract. A statute of the state
of Washington, where the transaction took place, provides that conditional
sales of personal property, when the property is put in the possession of the
vendee, shall be absolute as to all bona fide subsequent creditors if within
ten days after the taking possession by the vendee a memorandum of the
sale is filed.4 The contract was filed on November 12, 1959. Since $2,616.40
remained unpaid at the date of bankruptcy, Edwards, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, sought to avoid the contract under his status as lien creditor pro-
vided in Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act.' The referee in bankruptcy
decreed that the contract was null and void as to the trustee. After an
affirmance of the referee's order in the district court, Finance appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. HELD: The phrase "upon
1 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
2
 The contract, which was signed by bankrupt and Strato Motors, was immediately
assigned and transferred by Strato Motors to Pacific Finance Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Finance).
3
 By a mutual mistake of the parties thereto the contract was dated October 10,
1959, but the true date of its execution was November 10, 1959 and Finance sought
reformation to this effect. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Washington, however,
preclude reformation of such contract on the ground of a mutual mistake if such
reformation will affect the rights of bona fide general creditors.
4 Wash. Rev. Code § 63.12.010 (1961).
15
 Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), It U.S.C. § 110(c) (1958) reads
in part:
	 .
The trustee, as to all property • .	 upon which a creditor of the bankrupt
could have obtained a lien . . . at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed
vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
then holding a lien thereon . . . whether or not such a creditor actually exists.
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which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien" referred to
an actual creditor and since it appeared that there were no creditors of the
bankrupt whose claims arose after October 10, 1959, the trustee had no
powers to exercise under 70c. The clause "whether or not such a creditor
actually exists" was held to refer only to the phrase "creditor then holding
a lien thereon."
Although the substantive law of the jurisdiction which governs the
property in question determines the nature and extent of the "rights, reme-
dies and powers" exercisable by the trustee in bankruptcy in his status
as a lien creditor, the issues of whether and in what circumstances he may
acquire such a status is a federal question covered by the Bankruptcy Act.°
That the trustee enjoys a status of a hypothetical lien creditor' who assumes
that status at the date of bankruptcy, and not at any anterior point of time
seems clear. 8 However, the date at which this hypothetical lien creditor is
deemed to have extended credit has been a matter of some dispute.
From 1954 to 1961 the most significant decision in this area was Con-
stance v. Harvey!' The effect of the Constance case was to allow the trustee
in bankruptcy to relate back the extension of credit from which he acquired
his lien to any point of time prior to bankruptcy. This case was subject
to much criticism,t° for although the purpose of 70c was to protect the
estate of the bankrupt against secret liens, 11 under Constance the trustee
was able to prevail in situations which had occurred years previously where
it appeared that no actual creditors were injured. Although, as this note will
reveal, this result is still possible under at least one set of circumstances,
the wholly inequitable treatment under the Constance doctrine has been
sharply curtailed.
In 1961 the case of Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit 12
° See In re Consorto Constr. Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1954); McKay v. Trusco
Fin. Co,, 198 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Robbins v. Bastian, 135 F.2d 298 (8th
Cir. 1943); In re Wright Indus., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940).
7
 Hoffman v. Cream-o Prod., 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 815
(1950).
Bailey v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915); In re Consorto Constr. Co.,
supra note 6, at 678-79; Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658
(2d Cir. 1940).
9 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955) where, under a
particular New York transaction, the court found that since an existing creditor with-
out notice of a chattel mortgage could have obtained a lien at the date of bankruptcy
and the trustee has the position of an "ideal" hypothetical creditor, his position must
prevail over that of the chattel mortgage holder—even though no such creditor actually
existed. The concept set forth in this case was favored in some cases, e.g., Towers v.
Curry, 247 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1957), England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1956), but was rejected in others, e.g., In re Billings, 170 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959),
In re Am. Textile Printers Co., 152 F. Supp. 901 (D.N.J. 1957).
10 MacLachlan, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured Transactions, 60 Colum.
L. Rev. 593 (1960) ; Marsh, Constance v. Harvey—The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-
Evaluated, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 65 (1955) ; Weintraub, Levin, Beldock, The. Strong Arm
Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel Mortgage, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 261 (1956) ; Com-
ment, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1227 (1959).
11 Marsh, supra note 10, at 65, 75.




was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In this case a mort-
gagee recorded a chattel mortgage four days after it was executed. Five
months later a petition in bankruptcy was filed. The law of Michigan, where
the transaction took place, provided that a chattel mortgage was void
against creditors of the borrower who became such in the period between
execution and recordation unless the mortgagee took possession of the
chattel or unless the mortgage was recorded immediately. There was no
evidence of any actual extension of credit during this period. The Supreme
Court held that:
[T]he rights of the creditors, existing or hypothetical, to which the
trustee succeeds under Section 70c are to be ascertained as of the
time when the bankruptcy petition is filed and not at an anterior
point of time. The trustee acquires the 'status of the creditor' as of
the time when the petition in bankruptcy is filed. The holding in
Constance v. Harvey, which would allow the trustee to upset secur-
ity transactions entered into years before the bankruptcy as long
as he could posit a hypothetical situation in which a creditor might
have had such a right, is not to be followed."
Although the decision in the Lewis case did not explicitly state when
the trustee's creditor is deemed to have extended credit, the result reached
necessarily dictates that credit is extended and the lien acquired on the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The Court in the Constance
case was concerned only with the trustee's status as a lien creditor on the
date of bankruptcy. It was not particularly concerned that the creditor status
of the trustee was deemed to have arisen at a time prior to the date of
bankruptcy. To overrule Constance, the Supreme Court had to determine
when credit can be deemed to have been extended since under Michigan
law the extension of credit had to be within a particular time before the
trustee could claim superior rights. The Court stated that "the trustee
acquires the status of a creditor as of the time when the petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed." In the light of the Constance holding, and in view of the
fact that the Court did not use the words "status as a lien creditor," the
extension of credit must be deemed to have occurred on the date of bank-
ruptcy. This conclusion has the support of most authors who have written
on the subject."
While there is language in the Lewis case which was cited by both
counsel for Finance and the court of appeals to support the conclusion
in the instant case," it is submitted that the cited language was dictum and
should be treated as such. The actual holding of the Lewis case, based on
the facts, would not support the result reached in the principal case.
It would appear that the construction which 70c received in the
instant case—if it is the true construction—reduces the usefulness of section
13 Comment, 2 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 372, 373 (1961).
14
 Marsh, supra note 10, at 74-75; Comment, 57 Mich, L. Rev. 1227, 1230 (1959);
Comment, 2 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 372 (1961).
15
 Brief for Appellants, pp. 16-17; 304 F.2d at 229.
411
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
70e 16
 if an actual subsequent creditor existed under circumstances similar
to those in the present situation. If such a creditor actually exists the trustee
can "step into his shoes" under the provisions of 70e which provide that any
transfer voidable under state or federal law by any creditor of the debtor
having a provable claim under the Bankruptcy Act shall be null and void
as to the trustee. Since under the rule of the principal case, if an actual
creditor exists, 70c will automatically give the trustee a lien of that creditor,
exercise of 70e powers in a similar situation would be impractical." To
return vitality to 70e the interpretation of 70c found in the Lewis case
would seem to be correct.
Once one has accepted the above positions the result reached in the
instant case seems clearly wrong. The trustee's hypothetical creditor, since
he is considered to have extended credit on the date of bankruptcy, would
have to be considered a subsequent creditor and as such would, under the
Washington statute, have the power to avoid the contract here in question.' g
It is significant to note that under the Uniform Commercial Code a
court which properly construed 70c would give the trustee in bankruptcy
rights superior to those of the conditional contract holder in circumstances
similar to those in the instant case.' 9
DAVID W. CARROLL
Constitutional Law—Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporation—Sales to
an Independent Distributor within the Forum.—Sanders Associates, inc.
v. Galion iron Works CI Mfg. Cal—Sanders, a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in New Hampshire, contracted with Galion,
an Ohio corporation, to develop an automatic attachment for the latter's
road grading equipment. Sanders brought an action in the United States
District Court for New Hampshire against Galion for breach of the contract.
In addition to this contract, Galion's only other contacts with the state arose
16 Bankruptcy Act § 70e, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1958).
17 Under section 70e, transactions are not automatically void as to the trustee.
This section merely creates a power of avoidance which the trustee must exercise in a
proper court. Collier, Bankruptcy Manual §§ 70.46 to .50 (2d ed. 1961). Under sec-
tion 70c, the trustee automatically acquires a lien without any court action. Id. § 70.30.
18 Sec Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 783 (1961), where there is a discussion of the
Lewis case as applied to a Washington statute which is similar to the one involved in
the instant case.
19 UCC § 9-302(1) (d) provides in part:
(1) a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except
the following ..
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing
is required . . . for a motor vehicle required to he licensed.. . .
UCC § 9-301(2) gives the secured party 10 days after the collateral comes into
possession of the debtor to file and thus perfect his interest.
This result, however, would not be reached under the Massachusetts Uniform
Commercial Code (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 9-302) (1958) which does not
require filing to perfect security interests in consumer goods, and makes no exception
for motor vehicles required to be licensed.
1 304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962).
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